AI Is Breaking the Venture Funding Ladder and Raising the Bar for Software M&A (Part II)

As discussed in Part I, the key dividing line in software is increasingly less horizontal vs. vertical and more system of record vs. replaceable interface. The same shift is reshaping venture funding and M&A.

by 
Absolvo
October 27, 2026
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5 min read
https://www.absolvo.eu/insights/ai-venture-funding-ladder-software-ma-part-2
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Historically, the venture path was relatively predictable: Seed funded the team and product, Series A signaled early product-market fit, Series B funded repeatable go-to-market and scale, and M&A typically came later — after years of product development, capital investment and organizational build-out.

AI is compressing that journey.

Series A is becoming a weaker maturity signal for software

According to Stripe, its top 100 AI companies reached $1M in annualized revenue in a median 11.5 months, around four months faster than the fastest-growing SaaS companies at the height of the subscription boom. Younger AI businesses reached major revenue milestones roughly three times faster than companies founded before 2020.

The efficiency can be equally striking. Bessemer Venture Partners’ high-growth AI “Supernovas” generated around $1.13M of ARR per employee, four to five times its traditional SaaS benchmark, although their roughly 25% average gross margin also shows that rapid growth does not automatically mean durable economics.

At the same time, valuations are moving earlier. PitchBook puts the median US AI Series A pre-money valuation at $54.9M in 2025 versus $40.2M for non-AI companies, a roughly 37% premium for the typical AI company, not just the standouts, paid before investors can reliably tell future winners from laggards

For founders, particularly in application-layer businesses with healthy margins, this weakens the logic of the traditional funding ladder. If a seed round can take a company much further with less headcount and lower burn, another financing round, and another meaningful dilution event, becomes less automatic. (The exception is AI companies with thin margins or heavy compute costs, which often need more capital, not less.)

For investors, the problem is almost the reverse: companies can become expensive before retention, repeatable GTM, switching costs and a durable moat are fully proven. Series A can therefore become an awkward risk/reward point, already too expensive to invest cheaply, but still too early to know who the winner is.

Where funding and M&A meet

The same force that makes startups cheaper to build can also make them less valuable to acquire. If AI allows a buyer to recreate most of a product faster and with a smaller team, the obvious question becomes: why buy it rather than build it?

If the value sits mainly in a replaceable interface, that question becomes harder to answer. If the business controls a system of record, proprietary data or deeply embedded workflows, the equation is different: code can be rebuilt, but years of data, integrations, customer relationships and workflow depth cannot.

That is why AI can simultaneously create more startups and a higher M&A bar. SaaS M&A remains very active: Software Equity Group recorded 2,784 transactions on a trailing-twelve-month basis through Q2 2026, the highest level it has tracked.  But the mix matters, the higher bar shows up in price rather than volume. Private SaaS M&A has been clearing at a 4.0x median EV/TTM revenue through mid-2026, and strategic buyers pay up mainly for assets adding proprietary data, AI capabilities, embedded workflows or mission-critical functionality.

Recent transactions make the valuation reset tangible. Airtable went from an $11bn+ valuation in 2021 to a $1.285bn enterprise value in 2026, while Miro went from $17.5bn in 2022 to $1.355bn enterprise value, despite Airtable still growing ARR above 20% to approximately $480 million and Miro generating around $600 million of ARR. Part of that gap reflects the end of zero interest rates: 2021–22 valuations were set at peak liquidity, and most software has since de-rated. But pricing both at under 3x ARR also says something about strategic value.  These are widely used collaboration tools, but they sit closer to the interface than to the system of record.

Funding-round valuations and acquisition prices are not directly comparable, but the direction is clear: today's buyers apply a much tougher test of strategic scarcity.

Capital has not disappeared; it has become more selective and is being reallocated. Higher-for-longer interest rates have raised the cost of financing acquisitions, particularly for leveraged private equity buyers, while unprecedented spending flows into AI infrastructure and internal development For CEE software businesses, perceived country risk and smaller scale can add another hurdle, especially where AI defensibility is uncertain. Acquisitions therefore need a stronger rationale: something a buyer cannot efficiently build itself, at a price that justifies the combined risks.

CEE Software Exits: The Market Has Moved

CEE VC funds raised €832M in 2021 and €708M in 2022, according to Invest Europe. As those vintages mature, exit expectations shaped by abundant liquidity, low rates and pre-AI software economics need reassessing. Regional portfolios include many marketing, content and productivity tools that may not match buyers’ demand for mission-critical software. In our deals and buyer discussions, interest does not necessarily translate into prices shareholders expect. Longer holding periods raise the hurdle for delivering returns that justify venture’s risk and illiquidity.  

In today’s selective and rapidly changing M&A market, exit strategy has never been more important.

Conclusion: what can the buyer not rebuild?

AI is changing both sides of the same equation. For founders, it can reduce the capital required to reach scale and make the traditional Seed → A → B progression less automatic. For buyers, it lowers the cost of recreating functionality, raising the threshold for what deserves a strategic premium.

That increasingly pushes M&A toward a barbell: At one end are early acquisitions for differentiated technology, talent or data, such as Google's roughly $2.4 billion licensing-and-hiring deal with Windsurf in 2025, at the other are scaled, deeply embedded strategic assets, such as Thoma Bravo's $12.3 billion acquisition of Dayforce.

The difficult place is the middle: good software with some revenue, but insufficient scale and no clear answer to whether it is a system of record or a replaceable interface.

Because increasingly, the M&A question is simply: what has this company built that the buyer cannot recreate itself?

Sources

  1. Stripe: AI companies reaching $1M annualized revenue in a median 11.5 months
  2. Bessemer Venture Partners, The State of AI 2025: Supernovas at ~$1.13M ARR per employee and ~25% gross margin
  3. PitchBook: median US AI vs. non-AI Series A pre-money valuations, 2025.
  4. Software Equity Group: 2,784 SaaS M&A transactions, trailing twelve months through Q2 2026.
  5. Windsor Drake: private SaaS M&A at a 4.0x median EV/TTM revenue
  6. Bending Spoons: agreement to acquire Airtable ($1.285bn EV, ~$480M ARR)
  7. Quartz: Airtable’s $11bn+ valuation in 2021
  8. Bending Spoons, SEC filing (Exhibit 99.1): Miro acquisition ($1.355bn EV, ~$600M ARR)
  9. Wikipedia: Miro’s $17.5bn valuation in 2022
  10. Invest Europe: CEE venture capital fundraising, 2021 (€832M) and 2022 (€708M).
  11. Bloomberg Law: Google’s ~$2.4bn licensing-and-hiring deal with Windsurf
  12. Windsor Drake: Thoma Bravo’s $12.3bn acquisition of Dayforce
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Absolvo specializes in M&A and growth financing, backed by 180+ completed deals collectively in the CEE region. We support tech companies through strategic exits, private equity transactions, and cross-border growth initiatives. If you are considering an exit or a strategic partnership, our team is ready to help you prepare and position your business toward an exit that could deliver 3-5x its fair value.